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It has been suggested that the troubles of the C.A.P. constitute a 
crisis for the European Community but not for Western European agriculture 
(Josling & Pearson 1982). Certainly, the crisis has focussed on the 
Ccrrenunity's financial regime. The running of the C.A.P. until 1984 has been 
made possible by the Luxembourg Agreement of April 1970 (Strasser 1977). 
This agreement gave the Community, in principle, its own independent tax- 
base up to 1 per cent of the proceeds of value added tax (VAT) in the member 
states(l). The provision has been as vital to the development of the C.A.P. 
as the basic decision of the mid-1960s which set up the market and price 
system. In effect, the Luxembourg Agreement for a decade and more made 
decisions on C.A.P. spending to a large extent a function of needs of 
farming as defined by the government-farm complex. Without automatically 
growing revenues, the expansion characteristic of the C.A.P. might well have 
fallen fcul of political differences between the member states well before 
it actually did.
As it happens, the resources released by the Agreement ran out in 1984. 
So, at the most immediate level, the crisis has been due to the need to 
renew them. The net contributors to the Community budget, Germany and 
Britain, have seized the opportunity to set conditions for further 
development. They are in a position to drive a hard bargain for relatively 
small financial concessions. They can even ensure that the beneficiaries of 
the C.A.P. system have to come back again, cap in hand, after a relatively 
short while (perhaps 4 to 5 years)(2). They can recurrently put pressure on 
the other member states in formulating future strategies for agriculture. 



























































































seems to have done so and a new phase is opening in which it could well 
prove paramount.
However, funds have not non out in a void. They have done so because 
consumption has been unable to absorb the output of Corrtnunity farmers. The 
Community has in effect provided government markets, funded by taxpayers, 
for production which could find no normal outlets: by public bying up and 
storing of unsold goods or by heavily subsidising their sale at home or 
abroad (Villain 1984). As the amounts to be stored or subsidised have 
grown, so have the costs to the Connunity budget. It is no accident that the 
storm blew up in the final stages of the recession following the second 
energy crisis, the longest and deepest since the 1930s. Markets have bought 
less, and more farm goods have had to be stocked or subsidised. It is 
impossible to see the C.A.P. crisis in perspective without a view of the 
evolution of markets. Moreover, Community subsidies to farming have been 
largely due to the desire to avoid difficulties in the countryside. The 
crisis, therefore, is one for agriculture as well as for the Community.
Markets: the European Community
The usual view of the troubles of the C.A.P. is that high prices 
produce surpluses. Yet the fact is that high prices do not invariably lead 
to surpluses. Many Third World countries have high farm prices, by world 
market standards, and still suffer from rising deficits. An example occurred 
in the Cormiunity itself. Italy, despite moving to the same common prices as 




























































































food irrports boomed. Her self-sufficiency ratio, measured in grain 
equivalents, fell from 91 per cent in 1959 to 78 per cent in 1973(3). This 
phenomenon was typical of Southern European societies in those years(4). 
They all modified their eating habits, broadly by a substantial switch from 
carbohydrates to proteins (e.g. grains to meat). To produce a kilo of meet 
requires several times that amount of feed (cereals, oilseeds etc.). Meat is 
inherently expensive. A switch to proteins is thus a sign of rising living 
standards and involves an acceleration in the rate of growth of demand. 
Production in Southern Europe, though rising at respectable rates, was 
unable to keep up. However, by the 1960s the richer northern members of the 
Community had already gone through this phase (Brown 1963). In the Conmmity 
as a whole, the growth of demand slowed down between the 1950s and 1960s; 
and then dropped again more sharply after 1973 (Table 1). The rate of growth 
of population has been falling, the average age has been rising and as both 
the average quantity and quality of food people eat are high, increases in 
income generate only low proportionate increases in consumption. The 
Community has experienced very low rates of increase in demand for food 
since 1973 - not more than 1.2 per cent a year in grain equivalents 
(Eurostat 1980 - 1983). Experts discount a sharp acceleration even if 
general rates of economic growth improve in the years to come(5). Estimates 
published by the FAO suggest that demand will be more buoyant in Greece and 
Iberia in the 1980s (FAO 1979). Even so, production, in contrast to the 
period 1960 - 1975, is likely to catch up. In short, given the stage of the 



























































































is reaching, the demand for food cannot be expected to grow rapidly in 
future.
By international standards, the growth of output of Community 
agriculture has been respectable, but not rapid. Until the late 1970s, it 
was slower than that of the USSR which, being in an earlier stage in the 
consumption cycle, has "failed" because it has been unable to keep up with 
demand (FAO 1980a). Nevertheless, growing on average at a steady 2.5 - 3 per 
cent a year in grain equivalents over three decades, Cormtunity output has 
increasingly overtaken the growth of indigenous demand in the 1960s and then 
sharply outstripped it in the 1970s (Table 1).
Given the politics of the annual price reviews, the impression has 
spread that Community farm prices have been rising. The statistics suggest 





























































































AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL 
OUTPUT & CONSUMPTION IN EC-6 & EC - 9, 
1953/5 - 1981 (PERCENTAGES PER ANNUM)
EC - 6 EC - 3 EC - 9
1953/5 - 1959/61 a
OUTPUT 2.8
CONSUMPTION 4.1
1957/61 - 1969 b
OUTPUT 3.1
CONSUMPTION 2.6
1973 - 1981 b
OUTPUT 2.6 2.7 2.6
CONSUMPTION 1.5 0.03 1.2
Notes to Table 1:
a Values, derived from national accounts (for difference with grain 
equivalents, see footnote 3).
b Grain equivalent volumes (for sources see below). Not conparable with 
1953/5 - 1959/61.
For sources, see Notes 24
Corrected for inflation (as measured by the irrplicit deflator of 
C.A.P.), the prices of major products in the Community (e.g. wheat, 
sugarbeet, milk and beef) have in nearly all member states and at nearly all 
times fallen between 1963 and 1979, in some cases substantially (Commission 
1980). Yet in nearly all cases, output has risen strongly. The instances in 



























































































CHANGES IN PRICES IN REAL TERMS AND IN PRODUCTION IN SOME EC MEMBER STATES 
FOR MAJOR COMMODITIES BETWEEN 1963 & 1979
(Percentages)
Commodities Country Production Prices (in real terms)
Wheat West Germany 66 - 43
Sugar France 88è - 16
Milk Netherlands 65 - 33
United Kingdom 26 - 22
Beef Belgium 7 - 16
Italy 99 + 1
Sources: Eurostat, Prices Received by Farmers, June 1980; Eurostat, National 
Accounts and Agricultural Situation in the Community 1980; 
OECD, Statistics of Area, Production and Yield of Crop Products in 
OECD Member Countries; Milk, Milk Products and Egg Balances in OECD 
Member Countries; & Meat Balances in OECD Member Countries; EEC 




























































































In other words, costs fell so much that output was able to rise very 
markedly despite significant fails in real prices. Here is evidence of major 
progress in productivity on the land, due in particular to major 
mechanisation, major advances in bio-engineering and better organisation and 
management(6). This is not just a case of Europe catching up on earlier 
achievements in the United States. In the USA, too, after four decades of 
very slow growth in yields at the beginning of the century, the improvement 
of productivity accelerated in the next four decades (Sanderson 1982). Thus, 
whereas the stage reached in advanced industrial societies in the 
consumption cycle has slowed down demand, the progress in productivity has 
speeded up output. Supply has overhauled demand. Though real prices to 
producers fell substantially, they should have fallen still more to ensure 
that Community demand could absorb domestic production.
The reasons this has not happened are, of course, political. All West 
European governments, without exception, once immediate postwar shortages 
were met, have pursued policies designed to keep prices to their farmers 
well above what sales on open markets would have provided. As economic 
"miracles" and welfare priorities took hold, the main official motive became 
to help farmers close the gap between their generally low average incomes 
and higher average ones in the non-farm sectors of society. In some 
countries, such as Belgium in 1963, "parity of incomes" for farmers was 
written into the law(7). However, this cannot have been the only goal. It 
became apparent by the early 1960s that price "support" policies did not 
produce higher relative farm incomes, and yet they continued in force. 
Inproving food exports was one clear objective. Fear of the reactions of 
farmers to price cuts was perhaps an even more important motive. Farmers in 



























































































founding states of the Community and were a major electorial force. Yet the 
coirenitment of farm lobbies was itself revealing. Support prices, paid out on 
production, naturally favour big producers who increase output more than 
smallholders can. Large farmers, especially those in countries like Germany 
and Britain with substantial incomes off the farms, have done 
disproportionately well out of price supports (Agrarbericht & Hill 1983). 
Smallholders have obtained minimum security rather than higher incomes. 
National and, later, C.A.P. price supports have mainly helped large farmers 
and encouraged output.
A low and falling rate in the growth of demand is the yardstick which, 
in manufacturing sectors, denotes a "declining" industry. It is expected of 
such branches that they will have a slow growth in production and shed 
labour over the years. The Community's agriculture has shed about half its 
labour between 1960 and 1980 (Commission 1981a) but the growth of production 
has been remarkably steady and quite high (Table 1). In short, a declining 
industry has been encouraged to behave like an expanding one, ultimately 
because of uncertainty, verging on fear, about how to handle the economic, 
envirohmental, social and political problems of adjustment in the 
countryside. Masked by dynamic appearances of growth, policy has essentially 
been defensive.
The consequence has been to raise the ratio of production to consumption 
of food in Community countries, in other words raise self-sufficiency (Table 
2). This relative increase in supply was already becoming an acute anxiety 
for exporting countries, such as the Netherlands (dairy, pigmeat, eggs), 
France (grains, sugar) and Italy (fruit, vegetables) as early as the mid- 





























































































which opened up to all member states the major traditional European food­
importing markets of Germany- in the 1960s and the United Kingdom in the 
1970s, on top of the Italian boom in food imports in the 1960s which 
unexpectedly added a third major market to the two that were previously 
known to exist. Because the C.A.P. gave producers in member states a 
virtually total preference in each others' markets over all third parties, 
trade between Community countries from 1960 to 1980 more than trebled, in 
real terms (Table 3). Inports from the outside world fell by 5 per cent in 
real value in the same period. This provided a major outlet for growing 
European output at the expense of third countries. Denmark in particular 
lost huge market shares in the Community before joining in 1973(8).
However, as the levels of national self-sufficiency of all the member 
states (except Italy for a decade at the peak of the boom years) continued 
to rise, so did that of the Gornnunity as a whole. The original Conmunity of 
Six had a self-sufficiency ratio of 91 per cent in 1959. This had risen to 
99 per cent by 1973, when the UK joined. With the UK, the Community of Nine 
had a self-sufficiency ratio of 94 per cent in 1973. This rose to 107 per 
cent by 1981, when the entry of Greece raised the total for the Community of 
Tten to 108 per cent (Table 2). In 1979, the Conrrrunity crossed a major 






























































































SHARE OF NET AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN INTERNAL AGRICULTURAL 
CONSUMPTION 1959 TO 1981 ('PERCENTAGES) BASED ON GRAIN EQUIVALENTS
Country/Group 1959 1973 1981
Belgium-Luxembourg 87 96 94
France 98 124 135
Germany 79 82 91
Italy 91 78 91
Netherlands 114 147 161
—  EC - 6 91 99 110
Denmark - 242 246
Ireland - 184 202
United Kingdom — 61 77
—  EC-9 - 94 107
Greece - - 126
—  EC-10 — — 108
Sources: see Table 1. See footnote 9 for changes in EC self-sufficiency 
ratios when imported animal feed is included in the balance sheet. 
It is excluded here.
TABLE 3
THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE(l) OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF NINE
1960 - 1970 - 1980
(in billion ECUs of 1980)(2)
1960 1970 1980 1980
(1960 = 1)
Intra-EC Trade(3) 10.5 20.4 34.3 3.27
Extra-EC Imports 33.5 32.3 31.7 0.95
Exports 7.9 10.8 18.5 2.34
Sources : OEEC/OECD, Statistical Bulletins of Foreign Trade, Series C, Trade 
by Commodities, 1960, 1970 & 1$80.
1 - S.I.T.C. Categories 0 (Food) + 1 (Beverages & Tobacco) + 22 
(Oilseeds) + 29 (Agricultural materials including Plants and 
Flowers) + 4 (Vegetable Oils & Fats).
2 - ECUs = $1 in 1960 & 1970; = $1.39 in 1980. For ECU deflator see 
European Economy, November 1983, Statistical Annex.





























































































TWo major consequences have followed. The first has been a tendency to 
the choking up of the channels of trade between member states of the 
Community as the levels of self-sufficiency of each country rose. Exports of 
cereals and sugar between Community states have tended to stagnate and even 
fall since 1973(10). The second consequence is a massive shift towards 
exports on world markets.
Markets: the World
World food trade was exceptionally buoyant in the 1970s. The United 
States Department of Agriculture has calculated that its volume rose nearly 
5 per cent per annum on average from 1950-1972 and over 6 per cent per annum 
between 1972 and 1980 (O'Brien 1981). Almost the whole of the increase in 
world food demand was the result of the kind of process already mentioned as 
regards Southern Europe - a switch from the consumption of carbohydrates to 
proteins in some forty rapidly growing countries. These included Japan, the 
so-called NICs (newly industrialising countries like Korea), the OPEC oil- 
exporters and the Socialist states, including the USSR and China. The really 
poor countries were not a source of demand. They lacked foreign exchange and 
accounted for a minute proportion of the increase in world food imports. The 
buoyancy of food markets was therefore a consequence of rising incanes and 
changing consumption patterns in a large and dynamic minority of countries, 
not of the general growth of population in the Third Wbrld. In effect, a 
whole new range of countries, mainly in East Asia, the Middle East, the 
Mediterranean and parts of Latin America as well as the Socialist world, 
were beginning to enter the stage of the food consumption cycle that North- 





























































































The European Community was a major beneficiary of this worldwide if not 
universal increase in the commercial demand for food. This comes out from 
the Community's share of the increase in world exports for a number of 
particularly important commodities in each of the two decades of the 1960s 
and 1970s.
EC EXPORTERS' SHARE OF THE INCREASE IN WORLD EXPORTS OF SOIE 





Milk Powder 58 88
Butter 72 142
Sources: FAO Trade Yearbooks, OEEC and OECD Statistical Bulletins of Foreign 
Trade, Series C Trade by Commodities, various years.
Community exporters played a much bigger role in the growth of world 
exports in the 1970s than in the 1960s; their market shares were much bigger 
for sugar and livestock products than for grains; in a number of items they 
were preponderant, even overwhelming; and in the case of butter the 
Community not only accounted for the whole of the world increase in exports 
in the 1970s but displaced traditional exporters.
Between 1960 and 1980, Community food exports in the world increased 
over 2-3 times in real terms (Table 3). By 1980, the European Community was 
the world's number one exporter of wheat flour, barley, potatoes, wine, beer 
and spirits, poultry, meat (taken as a whole), dried milk, butter and cheese 
(OECD annual). It was the world's second exporter of sugar, beef, pork and 
eggs. The European Community was not as basic to world food trade as the 




























































































growing animal production round the world. It tended to concentrate more on 
meat and milk. But during the 1970s, and for the first time, it became a 
major force on world food markets. This is a very recent phenomenon.
From 1978 onwards, Community exports to the world provided bigger 
outlets for new volumes of production from Coirmunity markets themselves (11). 
But this has had two limitations. The first is that in contrast to the 
preferential Community market, it is not possible to depend on world 
markets. When they are expanding, they provide opportunities the slew- 
growing Community market can no longer provide as in the past. But they are 
not stable, as Community markets have been. Wien they stagnate or contract, 
there is little the Community can do. In 1982, world food markets fell and 
then collapsed. Community sales of milk powder to the rest of the world fell 
over 40 per cent between 1981 and 1983 (Commission 1983). Sugar prices fell 
to such low levels on international markets that in two successive years 
Community producers had to reduce plantings of beet by 10 per cent a 
year(12). These cutbacks were typical and nothing like as drastic, across 
the board, as those suffered by other exporters, notably in North America.
The second limitation is that since Carmunity domestic prices are often 
two to four times the world price, depending on the product, the stage in 
the trade cycle, and the strength of the dollar in which most international 
sales are denominated, exports are usually possible only with heavy 
subsidies. The Community budget finds this relatively easy to bear in 
buoyant periods such as the second half of 1980 to the end of 1981. But when 
markets are bad, as in 1983-84, the costs of subsidising sales or of the 
still more expensive storage of surpluses shoot up. This is how the 
recession in world food markets of 1983 turned into a budgetary crisis for 




























































































since 1978 in payments to the Southern producers of the Community and of the 
short-term collapse of world markets (Table 4). A revival of world markets 
could theoretically lift the Community off the shoals again. But the heavier 
the underlying burden of surpluses and the larger the payments to backward 
regions become, the heavier the basic weight of the cargo to be raised. 
Enlargement of the Community to Iberia will further increase the flow of 
resources from rich to poor in the Conmunity(13).
TABLE 4
THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY FARM SPENDING 
IN REPRESENTATIVE YEARS IN ECUs OF 1975
European Year EC Farm Budget Sales Stocks & Production
Community mn ECUs %GDP of Subsidies Equivalent Subsidies
of of 1975 Member (1) (1) (1)
States (millions of constant 1975 ECUs)
Six 1968 4069 0.60
1970 8392 1.10
1972 3465 0.42 1857 347 954
Nine 1973 4869 0.43 2877 377 1150
1974 4192 0.37 1515 642 848
1978 7314 0.61 3701 1557 796
1980 7335 0.58 4460 1211 1424
Ten 1981 6573 0.52 3684 1188 1649
1983 8260 (0.65) 4122 1726 2144
Sources: Conmission of European Communities
a) Report on the Agricultural Situation in the Community (annual)
b) European Economy, November 1983, Tables 17 & 48
(1) excluding MCAs
This has inplications beyond the short-term crisis of 1983-84. Various 
studies of world food prospects to the end of the decade and even the 
century have been made (e.g. the United States Department of Agriculture to 




























































































conmodities including Developing Countries in Toward the Year 2000). Table 5 
gives a summary of some results. These studies suggest that world markets 
are to the end of the century most unlikely to absorb extra-European 
Community production rising at the rates of the last decade. Even at the 
high rates of growth of world markets of the 1970s, it is evident that 
traditional Gorrmunity expansion would leave little scope for other exporters 
to increase sales, let alone maintain their market shares. This might be 
tolerated were the Community a low-cost exporter. On the basis of heavy 
subsidies, however, such expansion is a recipe for conflict with other 































































































WORLD SUPPLY BALANCES FOR SOt!E MAJOR TRADED COMMODITIES IN 1979 AND 2000
(millions of tons)
(+ EXPORTS - IMPORTS)
GRAINS
1979 2000(a)
EC - 0.4 + 60
LDC -52.5 -186 (-165)
Others 51.4
MILK
EC +12 + 61
LDC -15 - 67 (- 25)
Others +2
MEAT
EC - 0.1 + 5.2(x)
LDC - 0.3 -15 (- 3)
Others + 1.1
Notes to Table 5 
(x) Beef and veal only
(a) Extrapolates trade trends 1960 - 1975 up to 2000 (FAO 1979). Figures in 
brackets correct for lower LDC growth rates and for coherence in 
balances of payments between exporters (mainly Western) and importers 
(FAO 1981)
Sources: FAO Trade Yearbook 1980, Agriculture: Toward 2000 (1979);
Agriculture Toward 200~0' (1981); Eurostat 1980 & 1933
A number of other consequences follow from the Community's increasing 
dependence on world outlets. The first is that an exporter "cannot master 
prices; he must submit to them" (Bergmann 1979). This is a far cry from the 
tight control over prices and outlets to which preferential markets have 
accustomed European farmers in 15 years of the C.A.P. Export cartels can 
manipulate markets to seme extent, but even OPEC has discovered their 




























































































The second consequence is that when world markets fail, particularly for 
comnodities the Community dominates like dairy products or even sugar, the 
costs directly affect its domestic politics through soaring budgets. 
Steadily rising supplies contrasting with variable world markets and prices 
mean a prospect of sharp recurrent crises interspersed with remissions when 
conditions are good. This is likely to put maximum strain on the internal 
cohesion of the Community.
In short, the exploitation of world markets has to be geared to what 
they are able to absorb after allowing for short-term ups and downs. A 
degree of variation is possible but only within limits. The relationship to 
markets, which no exporter can escape, implies flexible responses in 
production. In view of the tendency to rigid growth of production inside the 
Community over a long period, in effect this means the control of output, by 
prices or by other means. Limits will be no less real because they do not 
preclude growth at rates and times world markets can accomodate.
Since the failure to make Community output responsive to demand in the 
past three decades has not been an accident but an expression of the desire 
to mask the need for adjustments in the countryside, restraints on output 
must bring out the basic problems expansion has masked for twenty years. The 
farm policies of the Community and/or the member states will have to change 
and enter a new phase whatever the short-term outcome of the crisis of. the 
C.A.P. Nor can the problems be finessed simply by giving up the C.A.P. to 
return, say, to national regimes. The C.A.P. was itself established to solve 
the difficulties of some of the member states. Solutions cannot be fcund at 
the level of politics and institutions alone; whatever else they do, they 




























































































Structures of Power in the C.A.P.
It is not possible to discuss policy options facing the Community in 
agriculture without analysing the structures of power within it. Any policy 
in any regime, centralized or not, is bound to be affected by lobbies and 
electoral or other interests. In a system which is confederal or federal a 
further layer of interests has to be taken into account: the balance between 
the member states and common institutions. This is particularly the case in 
a regime whose collective powers are as limited as those of the European 
Community. In federations, the power of the centre as against the states is 
sometimes measured in terms of the share of revenue accruing to the 
federation. In Yugoslavia in 1971, when devolution to the Republics from 
Belgrade was under intense discussion, a major issue was whether the federal 
authorities would control 20 per cent or 8 per cent of total public funds. 
In the C.A.P., the Community controls about one-third, at most, of funds 
that go to agriculture in the member states as a whole. The national 
governments control the rest(15). This "rest" consists mainly of social 
security payments, investment and consumption subsidies and tax exemptions. 
In practice, Commission figures underestimate tax exemptions, if not 
subsidies as well. In all but three of the member states, farmers pay taxes 
only on notional income, so that it is not possible to be precise about ’/hat 
the exemptions amount to (House of Lords 1982).
In practice, the Community deals with the finances of price supports for 
agricultural policy and the member states overwheLmingly deal with 
"structural" policies which govern investment and the pattern of holdings. 
Around 1970, the Commission proposed a Community "structural" policy and 




























































































refused and the rump of that policy only accounts for some 5 per cent of 
Community farm spending. Moreover, governments are in practice able and 
willing to initiate actions not envisaged in the original C.A.P., and which 
in effect constitute tolerated violations of it. MCAs have become the 
contentious symbol of the different price levels that obtain in the member 
states. Moreover, Germany and France have given national income aids to 
farmers (1970-72 in Germany, 1980 and 1981 in France). Such aids can be 
viewed as an alternative to (Community) price supports. Indeed, their growth 
in recent years is probably the consequence of the tighter price policy 
adopted by the Cotmission (House of Lords 1982). At different times, member 
states have closed their markets (e.g. Italy for eggs, Britain poultry, 
France wine and pigmeat). All these are manifestations of national, not 
Community, policies towards agriculture.
The national component of the C.A.P. is deeply rooted in the elaborate 
institutional networks for the integration of farmers. This can be shown by 
the example of France, which is more explicit than some, but illustrates a 
much wider reality. The Crédit Agricole, the world's largest deposit bank, 
enjoys' tax privileges as a cooperative, and is a channel for subsidised 
investment credit to priority categories of farmers. (Most member states 
subsidise investment loans to farmers. Britain provides capital grants 
instead.) In addition, there is a range of organisations 
interprof es s ionnelies linking farmers and food industries in each food chain 
(e.g. from grains to bakeries, milk to dairies, etc). Che French author has 
written that they impose "monopoly constraints with public backing" and act 
in ways "not always compatible with the common market" (Guillot 1980). They 
are constituted in such ways as to make possible subsidies within them. In 




























































































on the market and sell it relatively cheap to young or small family farmers 
who are thought to have a chance of effectively modernising their farms. 
About a third of sales each year are effected in this way (CNASEA 1980). As 
in most other member states, there is a national agency which promotes 
exports by agriculture and the food industry (e.g. SOPEXA in France, CMA in 
Germany, Food from Britain in the UK).
This might seem enough, but in fact other national pblicies can often be 
relevant to investment in agriculture. For instance, in 1980, there was a 
fuss between France and Britain over the establishment in Brittany of a 
turkey plant with capacity to supply the whole British market. The British 
met the problem by the simple expedient of forbidding poultry imports at the 
key Christinas period on "health" grounds. The plaint posed the kind of 
problems familiar in other industries from the concentrated sectoral 
competition the Japanese or Koreans provide. Three-quarters of the 
investment costs of the plant were subsidised. All the subsidies were legal 
under Community and national legislation relating to regional, employment, 
training or industrial policies in developing regions and could have been 
replicated in any similar area in the Community (House of Lords 1982). Most 
of these policies had at first sight no special relation to agriculture.
To a greater or lesser degree, a corporatist decision-making environment 
can be found in every one of the member states. In all of them, national 
corporatism does not become European, or deeply susceptible to collective 
control, simply by putting national agricultures in direct market contact 
with each other, as the C.A.P. has mostly done so far. It is like 
instituting free trade between nationalised industries in manufactures (a 




























































































The common agricultural policy is then a misnomer in many ways. What it 
really covers is a dual system. Hie Community's agricultural policy deals 
mainly with prices. The national policies deal mainly with investment in the 
broadest sense. There is a great deal of overlap between the two. On the one 
hand, there are different price levels in the different countries, despite 
the C.A.P. On the other, the Rome Treaty gives the Commission powers to 
limit national state subsidies which distort inter-state trade between 
Community members. Those are the kinds of powers which, in the United 
States, have provided the base for the growth of federal regulatory power. 
In the much looser EC, however, the broad division of responsibilities has 
so far developed in such a way as to give the C.A.P. a strongly national as 
well as Community character.
Member states have so far resisted effective supervision by the 
Commission of national investment in agriculture. A few years ago, a 
responsible Eurocrat estimated that only half of the national aids to 
agriculture supposed to be registered with the Commission actually were so 
(House of Lords 1982). The Commission has never succeeded in obtaining funds 
from the Council to set up an adequate monitoring service. On a number of 
occasions, the Commission has been refused permission to inspect suspected 
cases of lax or fraudulent interpretation of regulations by the national 
authorities. Member states in setting up the C.A.P. seem to have determined 
that investment policies, which can provide just as much incentive to output 
as prices, should be as national as possible and that the Community should 
have the minimum control over them.
In two decades of expansion, it has been easy to wink at violations of 
what any common policy should mean. There was room for everybody to pursue 




























































































away for later use. Once limits and controls have to be imposed, such 
indifference becomes too costly to be sustained. Either collective bounds 
have to be set and observed, with only narrow margins for exceptional 
national performance, or the system itself breaks dcwn and reverts to openly 
national priorities. As a result, the agricultural problem of exerting 
controls where none have been seriously applied before, also involves a 
European political problem of choice between more effective common policies 
or their erosion and progressive dismantlement. Significantly, in 1983 the 
Commission has proposed an interdict on investment that may increase milk 
production (Commission 1983). Policy options are radicalised, not because 
anyone wants them to be, but because the context has narrowed the room for 
the traditional and covertly ungoverned fuite en avant.
Crises break out in a system when changing conditions produce 
contradictions with which existing bargains cannot cope or create new 
targets of attention to the point of making them irrelevant. Either way, old 
rules have to be revised to meet new conditions. But once the balance of 
interests enshrined in the old rules has been called in question, the 
standard reverts from the rules to the interests and these set no 
preordained limits to the extent of questioning. All options are reopened, 
even if official assessments preclude seme of them ever rising to the 
surface. One may even jettison the system altogether. Assuming this is not 
the case and that the compact is renewed, it must still, by definition, fit 
current concerns, different from the old and perhaps in some respects 




























































































choices, whether they like it or not. This is a danger, and also an 
opportunity. Carried to extremes, crises can bring the house down, but in 
moderation they may produce a much-needed spring-cleaning.
In the case of the C.A.P., the first option is, plainly, not to renew 
the compact, i.e. to revert to national policies. Such a return to base 
could occur because individual governments hope to maintain domestic 
expansion along familiar lines; or because they think they can succeed 
better in their exports untramelled by collective constraints; or again 
because, whatever their own priorities, they lose control over their 
constituents - the farmers - who, in many countries, still carry great 
political weight.
There seem to be three different cases which need to be looked at. The 
first is that of net exporters in the Community. The problem for them is 
that if expansion goes on apace, as in the past, national self-sufficiency 
in all the member states will continue to grow and they will increasingly 
risk losing the outlets within the Community opened by the C.A.P., and from 
which they have gained most. This would be particularly serious for the 
small specialized exporters whose greatest successes, over a century, have 
been in the exploitation of the major European import markets, originally in 
Britain, but now equally or even more in Germany and Italy. Moreover, as far 
as world markets are concerned, exporters would stand to lose by having to 
fight for market shares individually. As things are, The European Community 
makes a very effective political negotiating cooperative, or cartel, and 
this would be lost by a return to outright national policies. Worse, such 
states would not only have to face the United States and other traditional 
exporters single-handed; they would also run the risk of having sooner or 




























































































member states of the Community who formerly gave each other mutual strength 
by combining.
The second case is that of the poorer states, mainly Ireland and those 
in the Mediterranean. These could well be tenpted to national unilaterism 
because effective controls would tend to cut off their hopes of being able 
to catch up on their richer partners in the Community. Ireland's dairy 
industry is specially vulnerable because it represents something like 10 per 
cent of GDP, a figure without parallel in any other of the EC countries. 
Controls limit hopes of expansion which for them are even more important 
than for the richer countries. On the other hand, the poorer states all 
stand to gain from large Conmunity expenditures which, particularly through 
the structural agriculture, regional or social Funds, may be expected to be 
channelled towards them and help them solve some of their long-term 
problems. In practice, this sense of dependence on the extra margin offered 
by membership of a Community with a higher average income than their own, 
seems to outweight the reservations about cutting off expansion. These 
countries would also find it difficult to secure outlets if they attempted 
to grow unilaterally without guarantees of markets in the rest of the 
Cortmunity. They are too vulnerable to take such risks.
The third category, the rich importers, do not suffer from such 
handicaps. At first sight, these are Eritain and Germany. However, Germany 
today is in most respects no longer an importer. Admittedly, it is not self- 
sufficient in pigmeat and poultry, imports of which are bound up in its 
special politico-economic relationships with the Netherlands and Denmark; 
but for cereals, dairy products and red meat, it is now a net exporter. It 
is also concerned with the role of the Community as a security factor in 




























































































Community country to have developed a thorough and systematic security 
policy towards the Mediterranean since the early 1970s. The special 
relationship with France which is at the base of all European integration 
also inhibits it from breaking up a common agricultural policy presumed to 
be of importance to France. For all these reasons, it is most unlikely that 
Germany would turn overtly to national unilateralism unless others moved 
first.
The U.K., at least in theory, has greater freedom of manoeuvre in all 
these respects, and is further away from self-sufficiency in food (Table 2). 
Even so there would be material costs. Britain is becoming an exporter of 
cereals. If the Community ceases to operate, she would have to take on the 
collective guarantees given to \Tew Zealand and the Commonwealth sugar 
producers as her residual responsibility, even though her own native 
supplies have greatly increased since 1973(16). Economically then, there is 
seme but not too much leeway. Politically, it is difficult for Britain to 
take the lead in unilateral action. She entered the Community because of the 
fear of political isolation if she stood apart from a growing Franco-German 
relationship. The EMS in 1978-79 and the overriding of the British veto in 
the annual agricultural price review in May 1982, have showed there are 
limits to the initiatives that Britain can take in the Community without 
risking isolation. Politically, too, her bargaining power can only be 
exercised within fairly narrow bounds.
For all these reasons, deliberately unilateral agricultural policies by 
the member states do not seem probable as a clear, once-for-all choice. They 
might, however, cone about as a result of a long and confused process in 
which governments lost control, either repeatedly in detail, or at some 




























































































violence, mainly in the Midi and Brittany, going back to the wine-growers' 
riots of 1907, and governments have in the past been highly sensitive to it. 
Farmers are not as numerous as they were but still constitute the single 
largest profession in most member states. If open or covert unilateral 
national policies are excluded in favour of collective (i.e. cormion) 
approaches, several kinds of measures can be envisaged.
i. Market Prices. The first possibility, in theory, would be to tie 
farmers' returns simply to what they can earn on open markets, at home and 
abroad. This is so far from traditional and well-nigh universal practice to 
be virtually utopian. Even if it were conceivable in Community terms, it 
would almost certainly presume a similar approach by other major 
agricultural producers and traders, which is also remote. The United States, 
for instance, limits dairy and beef imports by quota.
However, it is worth noting that even if such a policy were applied, it 
could not in practice amount to unmitigated free trade. The reason for this 
is the destructive instability imparted to markets from year to year by the 
contrast between, on the one hand, variable harvests due to the weather and, 
on the other, invariable ("inelastic") demand for products as basic as food. 
Caught between such incompatibles, prices rise exaggeratedly when there is 
temporary under-supply and fall exaggeratedly when there is temporary over­
supply (the "cobweb" phenomenon). Quite small shifts in supply one way or 
the other can produce enormous shifts in prices. These entail unnecessary 
and excessive costs for producers in one direction and consumers in the 
other; and give farmers false price signals for next year's crop when 
unpredictable weather conditions may, and probably will, change the market 
balance again. To prevent such disorders there would have to be buffer 




























































































smaller and therefore cheaper to finance. They could counteract the short­
term swings from one side of the underlying balance to the other. There 
would also need to be national (or Community) income guarantees to farmers, 
probably through minimumn price supports, to guard against the occasional 
extreme of a catastrophic temporary fall in market prices. These would be a 
safety-net in case the short-term swings are, in extreme cases, too big for 
buffer stocks to contain. These are always possible, because stocks need to 
be financed and there is a limit to the investment governments would in 
practice be prepared to make.
The point about such measures is that some equivalent international, or 
government, intervention is necessary even in the most unvarnished free 
trade policy. This has indeed been one of the historical foundations of 
agricultural protection. It illuminates more limited forms of open market 
policies, or moves in that direction, which might be more practical than the 
pure medicine itself.
Two Australian researchers have made econometric studies of the impact 
on grain and meat prices of a hypothetical instant freeing of Gonmunity 
agriculture in 1980 (Anderson & Tyers 1983). For grains and red meat (mainly 
beef), their results assume there would be a 40 per cent fall in output and 
in prices, irplying a 60 per cent loss in gross returns. Effects on income 
would not be as extreme, because lower output would entail lower production 
costs. Indeed, costs would fall very substantially for white meat (pigs and 
poultry) which consume large amounts of grain whose price would, of course, 
fall. Thus, while grain prices would drop about 30 per cent, production 
would rise by much the same proportion and producers' incomes actually 
increase. The authors did not investigate milk. Presumably, returns would 




























































































large as the total output of the cheapest producer, Mew Zealand, and United 
States prices, when the dollar is strong, are higher, if anything, than 
Gonrnunity ones(17). The floor on world prices would presumably be higher 
than for grains and beef.
An alternative French suggestion (Lelong 1983) is that cereals prices be 
cut by 40 per cent. This would achieve substantial savings in the production 
costs of livestock (in French conditions, 20 per cent on white meat, 12-15 
per cent on milk and 2-3 per cent on beef and veal). It would eliminate 
potentially the most contentious item in trade negotiations with the United 
States. It could in the longterm win back part of the Community market for 
animal feed, which has been heavily penetrated by exporters of cereal 
substitutes (mainly in south-east Asia) and of oilseeds (USA and Brazil), 
gaining ground against high-price Community cereals. Most cereals are grown 
by large-scale specialist producers who have some of the highest farm . 
incomes in the Community.
Such options are not practical short-term politics. They would cut 
returns too much. On the other hand, they illustrate a basic point. This is 
that reductions in cereal prices can greatly benefit livestock producers; 
and that even if the most drastic shift to market prices were to take place, 
some lines of production, especially of white meat, would actually gain. 
This would be the equivalent for the Community as a whole, of the strategic 
decision taken by the Dutch and Danes to favour livestock production against 
grains when cheap cereals first came in from the new continents a century 
ago. Significantly, the Dutch and Danes gained a dominant position in food 
trade in Europe during that period and those of their smallholders who 





























































































ii. Lower Support Prices. The foregoing suggests that there might be 
gains in more modest approaches along the same lines. The aim here is not to 
clear markets or move to free trade, but to control excess supplies and the 
growth of budgets. The Commission did indeed propose in October 1981 that 
there should be a reduction in the gap between Community cereal prices and 
those of "major competitors", meaning the United States, and stated that 
this gap was, at the time, around 20 per cent (Commission 1981 a). Because 
of the sharp ups and downs of the dollar, it is impossible to define a 
stable relationship between Community and U.S. farm support prices(17).
Anderson and Tyers have again suggested a relevant scenario, this time 
that the Community should, for ten years (from 1978-80 to 1988-90), increase 
prices by 2 per cent less than the rate of inflation, i.e. in effect cut 
real farm prices by 2 per cent a year. A longterm strategy like this would, 
procedurally, resemble the method, with predetermined goals and transition 
periods, adopted for the establishment of the industrial common market; and 
which Mansholt long ago envisaged for Community prices (Mansholt Plan 1969).
The results of the study, which imply a cut of 22 per cent in real 
prices in ten years, would be as follows for production and consumption in 
1988-90 compared with actual production and consumption in 1978-80 and with 
no change in real prices over the same period (in the table P = Production & 




























































































COMMODITY 1978-80 1988-90 1988-90
no change 2% cut p.a.
P C P C P C
Wheat 48.7 44.5 56.9 44.6 53.9 44.6
Coarse Grains 67.9 74.7 78.1' 80.9 72.3 84.5
Beef & Mutton 7.3 7.4 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.5
Pig & Poultry 13.0 12.8 14.4 14.5 14.9 15.5
Source: K. Anderson & R. Tyers, International Effects of the European
Community' s Grain and Meat Policies, Research School of Pacific
Studies, Australian National University, October 1983 (mimeo) Table
5.
Cuts in real prices would not stop production rising. In fact, for 
pigmeat and poultry, it would rise faster than if real prices were 
maintained. Consumption would rise slightly faster than with no price 
change, except for wheat. Though changes in both directions would be 
moderate, net imports would be markedly higher than if prices were 
maintained in real terms. Gross returns would fall about 1.5 per cent a 
year, except for pigs/poultry about 0.5 per cent a year. If one assumes a) 
lower-cost methods of production, b) a fall of 2-2.5 per cent a year in 
manpower on the land(18) and c) continued though slower progress in breeding 
of plants and livestock; average net incomes should not fall much on average 
in any commodity and for the more effective farmers might slightly rise. The 
targets set need not be socially untenable.
On the whole, such a scenario, however much it disappoints the 
expectations of traditional expansionists, is relatively optimistic. 
Perhaps, it is too optimistic. If one takes the response of output to price 
falls in the Community from 1963-79, the Anderson-Tyers results are fairly 
comparable for beef but imply only about a third of the traditional response 
for wheat. It is difficult, for lack of information, to pronounce on this 
striking difference. The main obstacle is that the past effects of national 




























































































be a sign of the importance of national policies in future as well as in the 
past. Further, one reason for perverse responses to price cuts in the past 
may have been not economic at all, but psychological - the well-founded 
belief that incomes could be restored, when that was necessary, by 
sufficient pressure on policy-makers.
This points to one of two conditions which price cuts of the Anderson- 
Tyers variety would have to meet. The first is that decisions would have to 
offer (indeed impose) credible longterm goals. Farmers would have to assume 
the price cuts would come steadily into effect and that adjustment was 
unavoidable. Without such a psychological change the pressures for upward 
revisions of prices every two or three years would probably be irresistible.
The second problem would be that the more vulnerable farmers would have 
to be compensated for their losses of net income (not, of course, of gross 
returns). There seems no welfare reason why more efficient farmers, given 
time to adjust, should receive such compensation. The only case would be 
where lower prices might lead for instance to lower land values and 
undermine capital wealth to the point where individual farmers had 
difficulty raising operating or investment loans and servicing their debts. 
Such problems should be susceptible to selective treatment.
The more general problem would, of course, concern those smallholders 
who have no off-farm earnings, are unable to make up losses in income and 
would lose the minimum level of security the C.A.P. has in the past 
provided(19). Compensation should be to individual farmers and divorced from 
production or the holding. It would lapse when they die and not be open to 
newcomers. The costs of providing compensation to such categories should not 
be impossibly high. This is largely because smallholders account for such a 




























































































growers cultivate only 8 per cent of the area sown. For milk, 55 per cent of 
holdings account for only 15 per cent of dairy cows (Commission 1982). Back- 
of-the-envelope calculations suggest that, in these circumstances, the net 
extra costs of fully compensating a gradually declining number of 
smallholders for a loss of 20 per cent in prices need not exceed 1 billion 
ECUs out of 16 billion ECUs for the farm fund and 24 billion ECUs for the 
Community as a whole on 1983 figures. This is not a huge sum.
The difficulties with compensation of this kind would be mainly 
political. At one level, there could be endless arguments about the drawing 
of lines between beneficiaries and others. There could also be considerable 
administrative problems because the register of farms for such compensation 
is still largely lacking and in some countries - perhaps those which would 
most need it - it might be hard to establish in a credible way (Harris, 
Swinbank et al. 1983). The deepest problems, though, could well be 
financial. For cereals, the big gainers would probably be Italy, Greece and 
Germany (among present Community states) and the big losers the U.K. and 
France; in milk, Italy, Greece, Germany and to some extent Ireland should 
gain, and the Netherlands and the U.K. lose. It is not altogether surprising 
that the U.K., the Netherlands and Denmark, whose farmers have the highest 
average incomes, have adamantly opposed schemes of compensation for 
smallholders.
Some observers have suggested that each nation should be responsible 
for giving income supports to its-own farmers (House of Lords 1979). The 
trouble is that unless there are strictly enforced collective rules, 
political pressures inside countries could quickly lead to uncontrolled 
subsidies. The danger (certainly with rich countries like France and 




























































































countries which most need compensation, because they are the poorest and 
have the most smallholders, are precisely those that can least afford to 
raise the funds themselves. In short, there would have to be some system, 
generally accepted as equitable, by which the richer Community member states 
make transfers to the poorer ones. An element of Community transfers alone 
guarantees both a minimum of equity and of controls over divergent national 
policies and behaviour.
Alternatively, the contributions of member states to budgets could be 
better balanced by spending more on programmes for declining industrial 
areas as well as poor rural ones (Pisani 1983). But while this would help to 
close the British budget deficit, it would aggravate the German one. It 
would also raise Community spending, which sits uneasily with the cost­
cutting mood of governments bent, since the late 1970s, on curbing public 
spending.
In general, reductions of prices, pursued at moderate rates over fairly 
long periods, need not pose economically and socially insuperable problems. 
But they raise four types of political difficulty which together assume 
major proportions. First, policy-makers must be persuaded by the 
calculations of the economists. Second, reductions inevitably raise the 
spectre among farmers of serious losses of income, and arouse resistance 
which requires strong government to overcome. Hard enough in a centralised 
democracy, such mastery is even harder in a multinational Community covering 
a great diversity of structures and interests. Third, reduced farm incomes 
through price cuts are liable to change the market shares and budget 
balances*of the member states, because high-cost producers (e.g. in Germany) 
are likely to be harder hit than more competitive ones. Compensation to 




























































































member states. Fourth, the very idea of compensation to smallholders for 
lower prices deprives the larger farmers of the political cover for high 
prices from which they have benefitted for so long. Naturally, they do not 
like it. How all these factors in combination work out in practice is 
unpredictable and governments do not like uncertainty, especially when 
taking measures that go against the grain of the agro-administrative 
complex. For all these reasons, a policy of moderate but persistent and 
predictable price cuts until control over production has been asserted, 
though the most promising of policies, also arouses heavy opposition.
iii. The remaining option is to impose Quotas. Quotas consist in 
limiting the volume of farm produce the authorities guarantee they will buy 
at a given price when the market fails to do so. It can be argued that 
certainty of being able to sell without limit at a known, remunerative price 
has been at least as important in generating unwanted production as the 
level of prices themselves. Farmers have been known to produce cereals and 
milk deliberately to sell not to the market but to the storage agencies. To 
limit certainty, then, is - at least in principle - an important innovation.
In practice, limits on price guarantees can come in one of two very 
different forms. The tightest way is to impose penal taxes on any farm 
production beyond the desired volume. If the taxes are sufficiently 
swingeing to make production beyond the target unprofitable even for the 
most efficient farmers, this stops all output beyond the set amount. This is 
the approach adopted by the Community with its 75 per cent "super-levy" 
introduced for milk in 1984-85. Canada also runs such a system for grains.
The second approach is much more permissive. It simply consists in 
according less support, potentially declining to no support at all, for 




























































































applied in the Community for sugar. There is an "A" quota, deemed to 
correspond to domestic Community demand (though in practice in excess of it) 
which benefits from the full support (2 per cent below the target price). 
There is a "B" quota, originally designed to correspond to "normal" exports, 
which attracts reduced support (currently 39 per cent below the target 
price). Finally, there is "C" sugar, which obtains no public support at all 
and is sold by the producers at whatever prices they can fetch on current 
world markets (Commission 1981c). It is a system which the British applied 
before entry into the Community, under the name of Standard Quantities, to 
the subsidies they provided to farmers for cereals and milk. Under the guise 
of "guarantee thresholds" it was applied in the Community to milk and is now 
applied in varying degrees to cereals, rapeseed, sunflower seed, cotton, 
processed tomatoes and dried grapes (sultanas), as well as sugar (Commission 
1984).
Quotas appeal to governments because they stop the uncontrolled growth 
of spending: it is possible to predict roughly how much will be sold to the 
storage agencies within the limits set. Sugar costs the Community budget 
relatively little(20). Quotas also avoid, at least at first sight, the 
involved politics of providing compensation to low-income producers. Up to 
the approved ceiling - in practice based on domestic demand and "normal" 
exports - producers continue to get traditional prices. In theory, so long 
as taxes beyond the limit are sufficiently penal, it is also possible to 
raise prices within the quota so as to meet income demands. This is very 
attractive. In principle, also, quotas lend themselves to international 
cartel arrangements. This is not surprising. They constitute a de facto 
cartel at home. They are therefore institutionally geared to cartel




























































































short, cause the least disturbance to the old arrangements and to government 
control of policy.
However, this minimalism in reform is also their main drawback. The 
more quotas are successful in imposing limits, as penal taxes can 
technically be, the more they freeze production patterns. Though the sale of 
quotas between producers leaving a sector and those staying on can provide 
some flexibility, this will not add up to much if those who leave are 
smallholders with little production to hand on. There is no competitive 
adjustment of the kind that lower prices provide by creating conditions that 
favour the least-cost against highest-cost producers. There is no incentive 
to move to a self-adjusting balance at a lower level of supply. The strains 
in the system are reined in but not removed. Where price reductions, after 
the first difficult years, should reduce the strains, quotas perpetuate 
them. One question, then, is how long they can be maintained against the 
grain of the system. Penal taxes demand strong government, difficult enough 
to impose for a long time in a centralised national regime. In a diffuse, 
composite Community, they imply a cartel of national production shares, as 
in sugar or steel. In these conditions, any upheaval or failure of authority 
in one of the member states is liable to break the consensus of the whole. 
It is the classic cartel problem.
Some of the difficulties become quite visible when the quota system is 
more permissive. Sugar is a perfect example. The prices of the "A" and "3" 
quotas (now treated in practice as a combined support price) are such as to 
let most Community producers meet their fixed costs. As a result, production 
beyond the quota limits can be achieved at marginal costs, which are far 
lower. Thus, between 1975-76 and 1982-83, Community sugar farmers increased 




























































































needs and dumping the excess, outside the quota, on world markets(21). This 
has greatly depressed world prices and undermined the earnings of other 
exporters who, apart from Australia and South Africa, are all developing 
countries. In fact, prices have fallen so low that in 1982 and 1983 there 
were no profits to be made even in dumping. Surpluses reached such levels 
that the Community exporters themselves stored them (an expensive 
proposition) rather than sell at an even greater loss. This made so little 
sense that in 1982 and again in 1983, 1 million tons of surpluses were 
counted against the "A" quota (as the Community regulations permit). This 
meant, in effect, that the guarantees of purchase for new output under the 
"A" quota for each of those years were reduced by about 1 mn tons (about 10 
per cent) and plantings correspondingly cut(22). This applied to all 
producers equally, irrespective of whether they were themselves responsible 
for exports. As a result, smallholders who did not increase production much 
were penalised proportionally as much as major growers who did. Their prices 
were in effect cut, but they obtained no compensation. Quotas, in this case, 
led to the equivalent of a price cut despite the implied promise that prices 
would ■ be maintained. Further, the route to these price cuts was a 
particularly costly one. Community exporters had acquired a quarter share of 
the world sugar market, starting from nothing, within six years; and had 
made traditional exporters, mostly developing countries, and smallholders in 
the Community, pay a large part of the bill for the exoansion of the larger 
European beet-growers.
Of course, competition too would hit laggard producers. But in that 
case low-cost producers - mainly in the Third World - would gain market 
shares, not high-cost European ones. In the event, the beet-growers who can 




























































































cost of low-cost exporters in poor countries as well as poor producers at 
home. This is no basis on which to conduct social policies at home or 
foreign policies abroad.
For all these reasons, reforms based from the outset on price 
reductions offer better prospects of longterm adjustment than do quotas. 
They also seem to have a wider range of application. At least, the 
Commission argues that quotas can only be imposed effectively where 
processing takes place in a manageable number of plants. There are only 130 
sugar factories in the Community and the 1500 dairies are considered a 
borderline case (Commission 1981c). The European grain trade is said to be 
far too dispersed to allow a similar approach. This casts further doubt on 
the effectiveness of "guarantee thresholds" (as distinct from penal taxes) 
controlling surpluses when basic prices within the quotas are too high.
In practice, some of the problems of limiting output can be very 
similar irrespective of whether price cuts or quotas are attempted. For 
instance, inadequate price reductions and insufficiently tight quotas can 
equally encourage lower-cost farmers to produce more in hopes of making up 
for losses on each individual ton produced. Again, both quotas and price 
cuts, by reducing incentives to operate within the lines of farming under 
control, stimulate farmers to seek compensation in other lines. One of the 
drawbacks of the Community coming so late to restraint of output in the 
C.A.P. is that there are now very few lines (and virtually no major ones) in 
which farmers can expand without generating surpluses. Controls are likely, 
therefore, to spread from one line to its neighbours.
Of course, given the different conditions in different commodities, it 
is possible to combine price strategies in some with quotas in others. The 




























































































on milk where the budget situation has become desperate; and reducing real 
prices (by not compensating for inflation) for most of the other major 
commodities, including cereals, olive oil, wine and some fruit and 
vegetables (Commission 1984).
Underlying Themes
Behind the technicalities of policy-making, which are themselves very 
important, there are a number of underlying political themes which are even 
more important for the future both of the Community and agriculture in the 
member states.
The first of these is that limits are bound to spell at least relative 
depression in the countryside. The problem of farming as a "declining" 
industry has been evaded for several decades. It cannot be evaded any 
longer. This is a fundamental turning-point in the history of the profession 
and will have many consequences. Some studies suggest the depression may not 
be as painful as farmers, in natural alarm at the end of unconditional 
expansion, will no doubt assume. Moderate but steady longterm price 
reductions might not cut net incomes much and even, when farmers are 
successful in cutting costs, leave room for some improvement. But the 
projections may be too optimistic in the light of past experiences with 
prices and output. There will in any case, at least for a period, be little 
prospect of average incomes rising much. If the general economy revives and 
earnings in non-farm jobs move forward when those on the land do not, 
relative returns from the land will continue to fall, as they have done in 
the later 1970s. And the collapse of former expectations, however artificial 




























































































Reduced growth will slow down the trend towards the concentration of 
output on a small minority of highly productive farms which high price 
supports encouraged. It will favour lower-cost and less intensive farming. 
The drift from the land will nonetheless continue, if only for demographic 
reasons. Though more gradually, the transformation of the old peasant 
society into an industry in many ways like any other will go on. Yet 
Community farming in the year 2000 will still be largely in the hands of 
medium-sized family farms, on average much smaller than British holdings in
1975. There is still, for all the changes since the war, a large remnant of
\
the old peasant agriculture. It is much more than a remnant in the 
Mediterranean, in Ireland and even in Southern and Western France and 
Germany. Its relative weight will be further increased by the accession of 
Portugal and Spain. The reduced prospects for agriculture will accentuate 
the problems of farmers, regions and contries who rely more than the rest of 
society on agricultural incomes.
Limits make plain what has in fact always been true of the C.A.P.: low 
incomes in poor regions cannot be improved primarily by channeling funds to 
agriculture through price supports. A declining industry cannot be the 
standard-bearer of the future in less productive areas. There has already 
been a shift in the thinking of the European Commission towards "integrated" 
development in "less favoured" regions, including industry, services and 
infrastructures as well as farming. But this is still not reflected to any 
extent in financial flows through Community budgets. A serious commitment to 
"integrated" development will imply a relative reduction of the excessive 
emphasis on agriculture in Community funding. It will not imply a reduction 




























































































surrounding the budget will not disappear with limits on agriculture. They 
may well increase with enlargement.
The political effects of limits will not be confined to budgets. Until 
farmers are convinced that limits are inevitable, the stability of farm 
policy will always be in doubt. It is always possible in a crisis year to 
impose "prudent pricing". This has been quite traditional, even a recurrent 
pattern, in the old C.A.P. The test of restraint is not behaviour over 1-2 
years, but the ability to maintain control for 5-10 years. That is a 
political feat of a different order. Left to themselves, governments will 
probably prefer accomodation within the C.A.P. to the dubious prospects for 
member states of striking out alone. But limits will exacerbate differences 
of interests not only between farmers and society but between farmers 
themselves, at different levels of income, in different countries, and in 
different lines of production. Political resistance and even violence may at 
times force governments into channels they would of their own free will much 
prefer to avoid.
Ultimately, however, the political issues generated by limits in the 
Community go even deeper than the obvious difficulties of maintaining 
control over the constituency. Limits on expansion bring out into the open 
the dilemma in policy-making as between national preferences and Community 
desciplines. So far, the C.A.P. has been much less common than its title 
suggests. It has been a dual system, mainly communautaire for prices, mainly 
national for investments. There has been little collective regulation of the 
latter. This has not mattered much in an expansionary climate. Each country, 
preoccupied by its own growth, paid little attention to that of others. The 
accent was not on disciplines at all. This changes with limits. Countries or 




























































































to actions by others which smack of sharp practice. Behaviour will have to 
be tightened up. The dual policy, in one way or another, will have to become 
more coherent and unified. Channels of action.may well remain national. Bank 
credits can hardly be anything else. But the guidelines will have to be 
genuinely as well as formally common. There can be no general restraint 
without national investment priorities being, de facto, folded into the 
common one.
Whatever form it takes, the control of investment policies implies an 
enormous practical extension of the writ of the collective. Since the lack 
of such controls in the past has been anything but accidental, their 
affirmation means a pooling of sovereignty far beyond that in the 
traditional C.A.P. However obscurely this is faced, or not faced, in the 
interstices of a complex, opaque and multi-national administration, the 
political issue is a decisive one. Accordingly, there is a clear potential 
for a reversion, initially covert and then increasingly open, to national 
agricultural policies. But if the risks of these are felt to be too great 
(for a range of economic and political reasons cited earlier), the 
reciprocal prospect is of an equally significant increase in the practical 
primacy of collective government. The crisis is a source of potential 
integration in strict proportion to the risk it bears of the reverse. 
Paradoxically, this could be the indispensible condition of the C.A.P. 
becoming effectively and not only formally common. It holds out the 
possibility for the first time of national authorities having to accept 
priorities compatible with operation as a collective, that is, of a 
genuinely common agricultural policy.
The final theme thrown up by limits is that the Community can no longer 




























































































one of the world's dominant farm exporters. The horizons of the C.A.P. have 
in the past been essentially confined to the Community's own region. With 
massive exports, the Community has to aca.uire some sense of the world 
politics of food. This would be true even if the Community were a low-price, 
obviously competitive exporter. It becomes doubly so when Europe exports on 
a diet of subsidies which are provocative to rivals and play a significant 
role in depressing world markets.
This is more than a balance of terror with the United States, inducing 
stalemate. Once the Community depends on world markets, it becomes involved 
in how effectively they work. Given the difference between Community 
interests and those of other countries, such a situation does not point 
clearly to a single set of priorities. These will depend on how narrowly the 
Community defines its farm interests and how far it tries to integrate them 
with broader policies. Even on farm issues, strictly defined, there can be 
differences between minimal approaches - say, caution in expanding market 
shares in one commodity for fear of competitors retaliating in another - and 
maximal ones, such as attempts to set up international buffer stocks to iron 
out damaging swings of prices from year to year. What choices will be made 
is a matter for speculation. What is not speculative is the fact that 
henceforth the Community cannot avoid giving thought to the international 
dimensions of its farm policies. This is new but already evident in the 
crisis of 1983-84.
Thus, a complex of agricultural policy problems which gradually matured 
towards crisis in the 1970s under the heading of surpluses, begins to 
appear, once the various strands knot together in the 1980s, as something 
much broader and deeper. Domestically, it means recognising that agriculture 




























































































regions, this demands a bigger commitment to broad development policies than 
in the past. Externally, it implies limits and a greater concern for world 
food markets and the effects of policy, not least on developing countries. 
For European integration, it raises the stakes either to a greater cohesion 
of policy in the Community or a disguised dislocation. All of this plainly 
goes well beyond agriculture in the strict sense. It is also bound to test 
the political resources of the Community and its member states for years to 
come. It is not the end of a crisis so much as the beginning of a new and 
widely ramified process, full of continuing strains and uncertainty. One of 
the prizes at the end of the process could well, with apparently paradoxical 
logic, be a much stronger and deeper-rooted European Community. In this 
sense, what is needed now is a common agricultural policy. It has certainly





























































































1. Import duties also form part of Community "own resources". VAT receipts 
account for somewhat over half of all income. Customs duties and 
agricultural levies on imports cover most of the rest.
2. This assumes that the ceiling on VAT proceeds for the Community budget 
is raised from 1 per cent to 1.4 or 1.5 per cent.
3. Grain equivalents are a measure of the growth of the physical volume of 
production. Products other than grains are given a conventional (but 
not arbitrary) rating in terms of grain. For instance, one ton of beef 
is rated at 8 tons of grain; one ton of citrus fruit at a quarter ton 
of grain. Grain equivalents are useful because they provide a constant 
base for comparing volumes of output. This is not the case with 
comparisons in prices because the ratios between prices of different 
goods are liable to change. In particular, since agricultural prices 
tend to fall over time compared with non-farm prices taken as a whole, 
rates of growth of output (for instance) tend to be understated when 
made in money terms. On the other hand, and for the same reason, 
comparisons in grain equivalents will not be useful for assessing 
trends in farm incomes.
4. Food exports expressed as a percentage of imports of food in Southern 





Greece held up better than Iberia until entry into the Community in 
1981. In 1982, the coverage had fallen to 99 per cent.
5. For instance, Bergmann (1979), quoting INSEE studies, puts demand 
elasticities for food at 0.2 in France, with population growing at 0.4 
per cent per annum. On these figures, even general growth rates of 4 
per cent per annum weuld produce an increase in demand of only 1.2 per 
cent a year. However, because farm prices fall in relation to other 
prices, the rates in volume (i.e. in grain equivalents) would be likely 
to be somewhat higher.
6. Plant breeding may well be the most important factor. In the U.K. it 
has been estimated that plant breeding accounted for 65 per cent of the 
increase in wheat yields in the 20 years after 1950. In the 1970s, all 
the yield improvement is attributed to the introduction of superior 
varieties (OECD 1983).
7. Article 39 (1) of the Rome Treaty sets as one of five goals of the
common agricultural policy: "to ensure a fair standard of living for
the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual 




























































































8. In 1960, Denmark accounted for 23 per cent of food exports between the 
nine states that were to be members of the European Community in 1980, 
but twenty years later this had dwindled to 8 per cent. The 
Netherlands' share fell only from 29 per cent to 26 per cent, and most 
of the change took place from 1960-1970. Trade trends mate it clear 
that Denmark suffered from exclusion from the growing German market in 
those years and over-concentration (perforce) on the sluggish British 
one.
9. These estimates take account of final agricultural output, and exclude 
the large imports of animal feed which are used for the livestock 
industry. If these are included, the Community1s self-sufficiency ratio 
of 83 per cent in 1973 had risen by 1981 to 97 per cent (all figures in 
grain equivalents, cf. fn 3). However, the trend is similar; and for 
world markets the Community's exports of final products (dairy, meat, 
sugar etc.) are enormously significant. (Sources as in Table 2.)
10. The contrast in exports of cereals and sugar (by volume) within the 
Cormiunity and to the outside world after 1973 is spectacular:
Intra-Community Extra-Community 
Rate of growth + between 1973 & 1981 
(percentage per annum)
Cereals - 1.6 +14.2
Sugar - 3.2 +21.1
(See Commission of the European Communities, Report: on the Agricultural 
Situation in the Community 1982, pp 247 & 24971
11. In grain equivalents, intra-Gommunity exports of the major farm 
products recorded in the annual Reports on the Agricultural Situation 
in the Community increased by some 5 million tons, extra-Ctontnunity 
exports by some 20 million tons between 1978 and 1980.
12. Sugar plantings in the Community rose from 1796 mn ha. in 1978-9 to 
2026 mn ha. in 1981-2, then fell again to 1667 mn ha. in 1983-4.
13. A Commission budget exercise, based on conditions of 1980, to discover 
how much enlargement from an EC-9 (excluding Greece) to an EC-12 would 
cost, estimated that net expenditures by the Nine would increase 10-15 
per cent. Spain and Portugal alone would represent an increase for the 
Ten of 7-9 per cent. The figures, however, assume unchanged 
arrangements and in this sense are quite static. Cumulative demands 
would almost certainly be bigger.
14. The Community being a temperate producer, its natural competitors tend 
to be in the English-speaking world: North America and Australasia. 
Sometimes South Africa. Brazil (oilseeds) and Argentina (grains) are 
significant, but less so. The main exception is sugar, where LDCs 
predominate. South-east Asia would actually lose from a liberalisation 
of Community farm trade because its sales of cereal substitutes to the 




























































































15. The last figures published by the Corrmission, and criticised but not 
improved by the governments of the member states, refer to 1978. For 
what they are worth, they put Comnunity farm spending that year at 7 bn 
ECUs and national public expenditures at 13.6 bn ECUs, including social 
security payments valued at 6.3 bn ECUs. These figures almost certainly 
understate the value of national payments or exemptions, such as from 
taxes. (Commission of the European Comnunities, Report on the 
Agricultural Situation in the Community 1980, pp 186, 234 and 243.)
16. In 1981, Britain was almost self-sufficient in cereals and, if one 
includes "traditional" imports, in sugar, mutton and dairy products as 
well. Together, these products come to nearly half of net agricultural 
output.
17. The difficulty of comparisons between American and Comnunity prices can 
be gauged from the fact that in 1980 the ECU was worth $1.39 and in 
1983 $0.90, without this being related to differences in rates of 
inflation or trade balances. In 1983-84, EC support prices were 25-50 
per cent above American ones for grains (wheat 25 per cent) and up to a 
third lower for dairy products (milk 13 per cent). In 1980 American 
prices would, of course, have been relatively much lower.
18. Between 1975 and 1980, labour left the land in the Community at a rate 
of 2.5 per cent a year (Cbmnission of the European Communities, 
Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1982 Report, p 285).
19. More than half of Community farmers are part-timers, but in 1977 27 per 
cent of all farm holders also had earnings off the land. In Germany, 
the average earnings of part-time farmers (less than 1/2-time) and 
still more of spare-timers (less than 1/4-time) are higher than those 
of full-timers. One of the main problems of conpensation to 
smallholders is to sort out those with and without off-farm earnings.
20. In 1983 the net cost of sugar to the Comnunity budget was about 400 mn 
ECUs, about a twelfth the cost of milk (Cortmission 1983, pp 26 & 34).
21. The Canmunity treats the exporters of the sugar islands of the 
Caribbean, the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the Lome Convention as 
full-price European producers. This is a major privilege, but adds a 
further 1.2 mn tons to what is in effect Comnunity output. This is not 
counted in the text.
22. Sugar factories which cannot sell their "C" sugar profitably on behalf 
of the growers under contract to them, can hold up sales and wait for a 
better moment to export. After a year, the amount held back is counted 
against the domestic, high-price "A" quota for the next harvest. The 
mechanism is necessary because otherwise the excess sugar would 
permanently depress the market for Comnunity exporters themselves.
23. France is, after Britain, the country in the Comnunity with the largest 
average size of farms (about 25 ha. in 1980 - Commission 1981ASC, p 
266). But even if the number of farms declined from 1.135 thousand in 
1980 to 640 thousand in 2000 (Bergmann 1983, p 284), the mass of 
holdings would be around 40 ha. each and the average would still be 




























































































24. Notes to Table 1 (continued):
1953/5 - 1959/61: Output - Pierre Gonod, "Evolution de la Productivité 
de l'Agriculture dans la CEE" in Comnission of the European 
Communities, Informations Internes sur l'Agriculture 44 - 1969 pp 309 - 
313; Consumption - UN, National Accounts;
1957/61 - 1969: Guenther Thiede, "Die Versorgungslage der EW3 mit 
landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen", Ministry of Agriculture, Bonn, 
Bericht ueber Landwirtschaft, Band XLVIII, 1970 Heft 2, pp 228-275;
1973 & 1981: Commission of the European Communities, Eurostat, "Overall 
Accounts on the Community Supply Situation based on grain equivalents", 
Agricultural Statistical Studies, 22, 1980; & Cost Production 1 - 1983, 





























































































Agrarbericht, the annual official German Green Book, published by the 
Federal German Ministry of Agriculture.
Anderson (Kym) & Tyers (Ronald), International Effects of the European 
Community's Grain and Meat Policies, Research School of Pacific Studies 
(sic), Australian National University, October 1983.
Bergmann (Denis)
1979 - L'Agriculture Française: Perspectives, Strategies et Politiques à 
Long Terme, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, Paris.
1983 - "French Agriculture - Trends, outlook and policies", Food Policy,
November 1983, pp 270-286.
Bourrinet (Jacques) & Stioui (Raoul), L 'Adhésion de la Grèce, de 1'Espagne 
et du Portugal aux Gommunautés Européennes : Contraintes et Possibilités 
Nouvelles vis-à-vis du Bassin Méditerranéen, C.E.R.I.C., Université 
d'Aix-Marseille III, (undated) 1982.
Brown (Lester), Man Land & Food, United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economie Research Service, Foreign Agricultural Economie Report 11, 1963.
CNASEA (Centre National pour l'Aménagement des Structures des Exploitations 
Agricoles), Contribution à une Nouvelle Politique de l'Exploitation 
Agricole, Paris.
Commission of the European Poimrunities
ASC - Agricultural Situation in the Community (annual)
1980 - Prices received by Farmers, June 1980
1981a - Guidelines for European Agriculture, COM (81) 608 final, 23
October 1981
1981b - L'Industrie Alimentaire dans le CEE, DG III
1981c - Ihe New Common Market Organisation for Sugar, Green Europe
Newsletter 1981
1983 - Adjustment of the Cornton Agricultural Policy, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement 4/83, July 1983
1984 - European Community Commission proposes agricultural prices for 
1984/85, Green Europe Newsletter No. 24
Eurostat (Statistical Office of the Commission of the European 
Communities)
1980 - Overall accounts on the Community supply situation based on grain
equivalents, Agricultural Statistical Studies, No 22




























































































FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations)
Agriculture Toward the Year 2000, Version 1 - 1979, Version 2 - 1981
1979 - Commodity Review and Outlook 1979-1980, Ch TV - The Commodity 
Trade Implications of EEC Enlargement
1980a - Production Yearbook 1980
1980b - Trade Yearbook 1980
Guillot (P), Typologie des Interprofessions, Paris 1980.
Harris (Simon), Swinbank (Alan) and Wilkinson (Guy), The Food and Farm 
Policies of the European Community, London 1983.
Hill (Berkeley), Farm Incomes: Myths and Perspectives, Lloyds Bank Review, 
July 1983, pp 35-48.
House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities
1979 - EEC Sugar Policy, Minutes of Evidence 27 June 1979
1980a - The Common Agricultural Policy, 32nd Report, 5 February 1980
1980b - EEC Sugar Policy, 44th Report, with Minutes of Evidence, 19 March
1980
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International Dairy Arrangement (Gatt), The World Market for Dairy Products, 
28 October 1982.
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